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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
card the ancient concept of nonrecognition of the trust estate has
made this economic enterprise an exception to this policy. Begin-
ning in 1893 with Miller v. Smythe up to the year 1951, when New
Mexico became the seventh state to adopt the Uniform Trusts Act,
there has been a very definite trend toward the imposition of primary
liability upon the trust estate. By so doing the potential liability in
the operation of the active trust will be borne in the same manner
as that of practically every other type of commercial enterprise. It
is submitted that such alignment is in complete accord with modern
legal policy.68
REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE UNDER UNILATERAL TYPE LISTINGS,
WHERE THE CUSTOMER ACTS TO DEPRIVE THE BROKER
OF His COmmisSION
This note concerns the plight of the real estate broker in cases
where, being under a mere unilateral listing employment, he finds
that a customer to whom he has shown property has, subsequently,
in order to save the amount of the commission, dealt clandestinely
with the seller. In order to fully understand the reasons for the ex-
istence of this problem and properly to evaluate the legal approaches
toward its solution, one ought to be familiar with the real estate
brokerage business and more particularly the practices prevailing
under unilateral type listings. An attempt, therefore, shall first be
made to illustrate some of the more practical incidents of unilateral
listings, to explain why those listings are indispensable to the real
estate brokerage business, and then to depict the resultant abuses for
which the law has yet failed to grant a remedy.
Unilateral Listings
The broker falls within a class of agents known as specia'agents;
that is, he is an agent employed merely to perform certain specific
68 ".. . there is . . . no other situation [other than an active trust] where
one may assume to carry on any type of economic enterprise without imposing
on the capital embarked in it the cost of compensating for its expense or for
the tortious acts committed by those who are engaged in carrying it on. Not
only has this been the traditional policy of the law in the application of the
doctrine of respondeat superior, but we have in recent years seen a very marked
extension of it by workmen's compensation acts, the underlying principle of
which is that the economic enterprise should carry the burdens of loss occa-
sioned by the tortious acts of those engaged in it." Stone, supra note 4, at 529.
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acts for the principal.' His employment relationship stems from
some form of agreement with the principal, and generally, the specific
act which he must perform is the promotion of a sale of property.
Today, the most common form of real estate brokerage agreement,
the unilateral listing,2 is not even a contract but a mere offer made
by the seller calling for an act as acceptance.3 The act called for is
the broker's effectuation of a sale of the property. The seller in
effect says to the broker, "I will pay you a standard commission if,
before I sell or any other broker sells the property, you produce a
purchaser ready, willing and able to buy at the terms which I will
hereby state as follows. . . ., 4 It should be noted that under such
an offer the seller reserves the right to sell the property himself or
through another broker without incurring liability to the offeree for
a commission, and that until the offeree procures a buyer, he has en-
tered into no contractual relationship with the seller.6
The broker working under such an employment engagement is
in a rather precarious position. Not only must he expend efforts
and money in attempting to accept the offer but, as shall later be ex-
plained, he is literally at the mercy of the buyer whom he must pro-
duce. Buyers, who are usually aware of the insecurity of the broker's
situation, frequently find that an amount which would represent the
broker's commission is the sole barrier to their arrival at a mutually
suitable purchase price. All too often they will attempt to hurdle
the barrier by hurdling the broker and in many cases such poor
sportsmanship is sanctioned by the law.6
1 MEMCEm, TE LAW oF AGENCy 44 (2d ed. 1914).
2 See Ingalls v. Streeter, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 351, 354 (Syracuse Munic. Ct.
1946) ; see 2 MECHEm, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1998.
8 See Note, Unilateral Offers-Real Estate Broker's Listings, 28 ORE. L.
REv. 248 (1949) ; 2 MaCEMcH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1998, 2048-2063. In the
case of Martin v. Crumb, 216 N. Y. 500, 111 N. E. 62 (1916), however, the
court seems to treat such a listing as a contract. The defendant therein con-
tended that since the broker had but a mere offer for a listing, the broker's
proposal of a purchaser at a less than listed price amounted to a counter
offer and thus revoked the listing. Judge Cardozo, in refuting that argument
stated that the ". . . contract of employment became complete when the plain-
tiff undertook to act as broker, and to use his best efforts to find a buyer."
Id. at 506, 111 N. E. at 64.
4 See 2 MacHEm, op. cit. supra note 1, at §§ 2428-2432, 2435, 2440, 2441.5 Mechem, The Real Estate Broker and His Commissions, 6 ILL. L. REv.
145, 146 (1911).6 The following are examples of judicial statements which, taken out of
context, would seem to condone a customer's maneuvering to avoid the com-
mission: "A purchaser has the right to choose the broker through whom he
wishes to negotiate. That a broker may have been the first to bring the prop-
erty to the attention of the buyer or that he may have initiated negotiations
does not give the broker the right to a commission. . . ." Newberry & Co. v.
Warnecke & Co., 267 App. Div. 418, 421, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 438, 440 (1st Dep't),
aff'd men., 293 N. Y. 698, 56 N. E. 2d 585 (1944) ; "If [the customer] saw
fit to buy directly from [the seller] he had a right to do so. If [the seller]
was willing to ignore his agent and sell to [the customer], that act did not
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The Popularity of Unilateral Listings
One may very well inquire why a broker conducts business
under the unilateral offer type of listing. It may be said that if he
chooses to do so, the law should not strive to protect him. It is in-
disputable that under our system of freedom of contract, parties are
often left by the courts to the consequences of a harsh bargain. The
real estate brokerage business, however, has emerged through the
years as a necessary and useful commercial activity. Its current
methods and practices are the product of the influences of the law,
time, usage and competitive enterprise. In order more fully to ap-
preciate why the unilateral listings have become an indispensable in-
cident of modern brokerage, a review of the influences seems
warranted.
We are told that the ancient Chinese, when dealing in trade,
invariably employed intermediaries through whom they bargained;
their reasons for so doing were probably as follows. Parties engaged
in negotiations contemplating a sale of property must place their eco-
nomic self-interest ahead of the ordinary attitude of fellowship and
generosity attendant to social contacts. Legal expression describes
this form of negotiation as "dealing at arm's length." When a person
so deals, he embarrasses himself to a certain extent by exhibiting his
selfish attitude. In dealing through an intermediary, the parties are
able to save face, as it were. They likewise may deal more cagily
by concealing the anxiety which personal contact would disclose.7
Although these impressions might have been very striking to the
Chinese, they have become less and less of a deterrent to direct nego-
tiations in modern times. It is nevertheless true that, although he
may not be employed primarily for that purpose, the broker today
renders the same service as did the Chinese intermediary.
Another change of custom, that has indirectly de-emphasized
the importance of the broker as an intermediary, is the modern trend
toward fixed prices. Nevertheless, real estate is still generally sold
by the bargaining method. Today, the average person is not used
to the bargaining method and consequently is unfamiliar with the
value of an intermediary.8 Not sensing the value of such services,
unless the broker is otherwise useful, he is looked upon as an inter-
meddling middleman. It is apparent, therefore, that the average per-
son hiring a broker today does so mainly for some reason other than
make [the customer] liable to [the broker]. . . ." Hansberry v. Holloway,
332 Ill. 334, 163 N. E. 662, 664 (1928); "[W]hen the defendants purchased
the property in question they intended to dispense with [the introducing broker]
for the sole purpose of having Gregory get the commissions. But they had a
legal right to do this." Oppenheimer v. Barnett, 131 App. Div. 614, 617, 116
N. Y. Supp. 44, 46 (lst Dep't 1909).
7 See MCMICHAEL, How To MAKE MONEY IN REAL ESTATE 279, 280
(1945).
8 See Fosma, So YOU'RE GOING To BUy A HousE 72 (1950).
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desire for an intermediary. Today, the broker is hired principally
to find from among the ever-expanding community a person who is
willing to deal at terms most favorable to the broker's employer and
only secondarily as an intermediary. A seller interested in finding
a purchaser will profit from the employment of a number of searchers,
especially when he need only compensate the one who is successful.
That is exactly the opportunity afforded the seller by the unilateral
type listing.
Real estate brokerage in most parts of this country today is a
highly competitive enterprise. Because of the personal nature of the
broker's services, it is not too difficult for a novice to enter the field
and immediately to provide a certain amount of competition." These
nurginal producers will solicit any type of listing available and will
welcome the unilateral offer listing. Sellers, in their anxiety to dis-
pose of property while obtaining the best price, will list with many
brokers and will welcome others who solicit listings. Piracy of list-
ings among brokers is quite simple and perfectly legal.10
Although brokers may frequently be heard to complain, this ac-
tive competition is far from a deplorable situation. Sellers receive
excellent service; the marginal broker, who finds that he cannot earn
a living, drops out of the business, and thus the field is limited by
the demand. While it is difficult for individual brokers to monopolize
the business, the diligent are rewarded. It would seem, therefore,
that brokerage under the unilateral type listing is here to stay.
Broker's Relationship to the Seller
Under the fact situation which gives rise to our problem we
must assume that:
1. the broker is acting under a valid unilateral listing for the
sale of a particular piece of property."-
2. the broker was the first to introduce the purchaser in ques-
tion to the property.
3. the purchaser in question subsequently, in an effort to profit
by a reduction in price in the amount of the commission, dealt
directly with the seller without revealing the fact that he had
been introduced by a broker.
9 MCMICHAEL, How To OPERAT A REAL ESTATE BUSINESS 35 (1947).
10 Cf. Newberry & Co. v. Warnecke & Co., 267 App. Div. 418, 46 N. Y. S.
2d 438 (1st Dep't 1944). It is interesting to note that the Real Estate Boards
generally do not prohibit piracy of listings in their codes of ethics. See
SPILKER, REAL ESTATE BUSINESS AS A PROFESSION 362 (1924).
11 See Note, The Status of the Implied Contract of Employment Between
Real Property Owners and Brokers in New York, 6 N. Y. U. INTRAMURAL
L. REv. 249 (1951) ; 2 MacHEM, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 2390. For a detailed
report on the feasibility of requiring listings to come within the statute of
frauds, see 1949 LEG. Doc. No. 65(G), 1949 REPORT, N. Y. LAW REvisioN
COMMISSION.
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Since under the unilateral listing the seller reserves to himself
the right to sell his property, he is not liable for commission if he
does so in good faith and in ignorance of the broker's introduction. 12
Should the seller be aware of the broker's acts, but elect to deal di-
rectly with the broker's purchaser, the law will compel the seller to
pay the broker a commission even though the latter has done no more
than to show the property to the purchaser.'3
It may seem from the outset, therefore, that the broker may
easily protect his introduction and prevent the purchaser from col-
lusion by informing the seller of the name of each purchaser he pro-
duces. Such protection, however, may easily be negated by the pur-
chaser. For example: he may give an assumed name to the broker;
he may purchase through another broker under an assumed name;
or he may deal directly with the owner through a "straw man." 14
In addition, a purchaser may deal with the owner before the broker
has had a chance to reveal his name. Another consideration is that
the broker may justifiably be reluctant to list the purchaser's name
with the seller in fear that the seller himself may attempt clandes-
tinely to deal directly with the purchaser in which case the broker
may have a legal remedy, but proof of notice is difficult.15 The list-
ing of customers' names, therefore, is poor protection for the broker
where a purchaser deliberately sets out to save the amount of the
commission.
The general rule, which seems to prevail as an underlying basis
for the decisions, is that there is no peculiar legal status attendant
to the relationship between broker and customer. 16 It is not diffi-
12 Strout Farm Agency, Inc. v. Spencer, 199 N. Y. Supp. 453, 120 Misc.
692 (Sup. Ct. 1923). See Note, 7 A. L. R. 87 (1920). The so-called ma-jority rule, that a seller may be liable to a broker for commission if he sells
to that broker's customer even though unaware of the relationship, is greatly
limited in its application, especially where the seller inquires of the customer
and is told that no broker is involved. See Note, 142 A. L. R. 275 (1943).
Holdings that the seller is strictly liable to the introducing broker for com-
mission in a case where the seller was acting in good faith, ignorant of the
broker's connection to the purchaser, have been severely criticized. See 1942
ANNUAL SURVEY OF AmERICAN LAW 493; 2 MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 2018.
13 See cases collected in Notes, 47 A. L. R. 855 (1927); 128 A. L. R. 430
(1940). In certain situations a seller may use the broker's softenijq without
paying for it. Cf. Sibbald v. The Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378 (1881)
(where the broker abandons the deal) ; Note, 88 A. L. R. 716 (1934) (where
the seller terminates the employment in good faith).
14 McAuslan & Nutting v. Futurity Thread Co., 245 Mass. 216, 150 N. E.
96 (1926); Sharp v. Keaton, 117 Okla. 131, 245 Pac. 852 (1926); Ringler v.
Ruby, 117 Ore. 455, 244 Pac. 509 (1926). See Note, Purchase Through Straw
Man After Negotiations With Broker, 14 CORNELL L. Rzv. 318 (1929).
15 Cf. Friedman v. Stern, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
16 See 2 MaCHEM, op. cit. supra note 1, at 2098. "[Tlhe broker assumes
no personal obligations and acquires no rights of action, the benefits and obli-
gations attaching only to his 'principals." Cf. Grossman v. Herman, 266 N. Y.
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cult to understand why the courts have not recognized any special
relationship. Since the underlying theory of any brokerage case is
that of contract based upon employment of an agent, and since the
customer fits into that relationship as an implement with which the
broker may carry out the terms of his employment contract, the
broker's relationship with the customer appears to the court merely
as a mechanical incident to the major question, the performance of
the contract. 17 Theoretically speaking, however, under our system
of jurisprudence, whenever two persons are situated in a position
with respect to one another where their relationship gives rise to a
flow of benefits or detriments between them, the law will provide
special rules for the relationship. For example, when one person
rightfully enters upon another's land, the law imposes upon the owner
certain special duties of protecting the visitor.' 8 Similarly, when a
person endeavors to confer a benefit upon another, ostensibly not as
a gift, the law will not allow the beneficiary to lay by and accept the
improvement without falling under a duty in quasi-contract; 19 a
person gaining knowledge of another's secrets as a result of a rela-
tionship of confidence with the other will discover that the law will
impose a special duty of silence although the secret be not otherwise
protectable. 20  The policy underlying these legal sanctions derives
from the flow of benefits and detriments arising from the special re-
lationship.21 Although there be no express contract, the law imposes,
upon the party receiving a benefit, a reciprocal duty, be it a duty
ex delicto (as in the visitor situation) or a duty ex contractu implied
from the attendant circumstances. At this point, it is worthy to note
the fine shred of distinction between tort and contract.22
We cannot dispute the existence of benefits flowing between
broker and customer. Had the broker no customers, he would make
no sales. Benefits flow, therefore, from the customer to the broker
by reason of the patronage. Conversely, when even the most re-
luctant customer consents to listen to the broker's offering, he is the
recipient of valuable services. It is not meant to be inferred, how-
ever, that a customer ought to compensate a broker; merely that
duties do flow from customer to broker.
The question may be asked, does the greater flow of benefits
from customer to broker cancel the lesser reciprocal flow? It is sub-
249, 194 N. E. 694 (1935); Hokar Products Corp. v. Griscom & Co.,
40 N. Y. S. 2d 54 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
17 Cf. Hornstein v. Podwitz, 254 N. Y. 443, 173 N. E. 674 (1930) ; Sampson
and Oppenheimer v. Ottinger Bros., 93 App. Div. 226, 87 N. Y. Supp. 796 (1st
Dep't 1904).
Is REsTATsmENT, TORTS § 341 (1934).
'19 See 1 WirLIsTOx ox€ CONTRACrs § 3 (Rev. ed. 1936).
20 RESTATEME.T, TORTS § 757 (1939).21 See McNiece and Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L. J.
1272 (1949).
22 See W.IsTo, op. cit. supra note 19, at 9.
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mitted that such a theory is illogical for the reason that duties which
the law might infer in reciprocity for such benefits are of an incon-
gruous nature. For example: the duty upon the owner of land to
protect the business visitor could not be said to cancel the duty owing
from the visitor not to abuse the premises. From this reasoning, it
is concluded that there are duties stemming from the broker-customer
relationship, owing to the broker. It is the failure of courts to rec-
ognize and define these duties that permits the existence of the prob-
lem at hand.
The case of Keviczky v. Lorber 23 was one of the first instances
in which the courts recognized the abuse with which we are dealing.
Therein, the customer and the seller by-passed the introducing broker
and consummated a deal through the medium of a second broker
who was obviously a "dummy." The court found that since the first
broker was so close to earning a commission, the collusive actions of
the customer constituted a tort.24 The name given to this "tort" by
the court was "civil conspiracy." The logic of that decision, how-
ever, has been severely criticized both in the dissenting opinion and
in other materials.2 5
Civil conspiracy has for its elements: concert of action to do a
tortious act or to employ tortious means.20  But in order to commit
a tort, the customer must have been guilty of some underlying tortious
conduct. The majority opinion in the Keviczky case did not even
imply what that tortious conduct might be. Thus, while there was a
recognition of the abuse, there was a failure to discover a reasonable
basis for the remedy. 27
The effect of the Keviczky case has been limited in later cases to
instances where the customer has prolongedly dealt through the plain-
tiff-broker in negotiating for the purchase, and then, at a point where
it is obvious that the broker is about to earn a commission, changes
brokers.28  The resultant rule remedies little the abuse with which
23290 N. Y. 297, 49 N. E. 2d 146 (1943). In this case the action was
maintained against the customer, the "dummy" broker and the seller. Subse-
quent cases have held its rule applicable where merely the customer and the
"dummy" broker are sued. Avallone v. Bernardi, 83 N. Y. S. 2d 905 (Mt.
Vernon City Ct. 1948).
24 Other cases which have held the defendant liable on the tort theory are
Krigbaum v. Sbarbaro, 23 Cal. App. 427, 138 Pac. 364 (1913) (interference
by outsiders where broker was close to a deal) ; Skene v. Carayanis, 103 Conn.
708, 131 Atl. 497 (1926); see Ringler v. Ruby, 117 Ore. 455, 244 Pac. 509,
512 (1926).
25 See Note, Conspiracy--Civil Liability Splitting Real Estate Broker's Coln-
inissions, 12 FORD. L. Rzv. 277, 279 (1943).
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 See, e.g., Newberry & Co. v. Warnecke & Co., 267 App. Div. 418, 46
N. Y. S. 2d 438 (1st Dep't), aff'd inem., 293 N. Y. 698, 56 N. E. 2d 585
(1944); Wolf v. Farkas, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 391 (N. Y. City Ct. 1944); Cohen
v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 276 App. Div. 195, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 609 (1st
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we are dealing, for the broker's main service today under unilateral
offer listings is that of finding, not that of negotiating. By the mere
disclosure of his offering to the customer, the broker has performed
the major portion of his services. The courts, however, refuse rec-
ognition to the flow of benefit resulting from the disclosure, but do
recognize it where there has been prolonged negotiation. But, as
shown above, negotiation is by far the less important service of the
broker.
It is at this point deemed advisable to draw a rather important
distinction. There are many opinions which reiterate the rule that if
one broker is more successful in inducing a customer to purchase,
the other broker is not, merely because he was the first to offer the
property, entitled to a commission from the seller.2 9 It is not meant
to be inferred that in such a case the introducing broker should be
entitled to compensation from the customer. Note, however, that in
such a situation the customer does not stand to profit from the change
of brokers. If, however, the second broker happened to be a friend
or relative of the customer who did not have a listing of the property
until after the customer was introduced to it through the first broker,
the good faith of the change might easily be challenged. A distin-
guishing line might be drawn by stating that our problem deals only
with situations wherein the customer, after being introduced to the
property by a broker, attempts to avoid paying any broker a commis-
sion, or where the customer attempts to steer the commission to a
selected broker.
Manifestly, the customer's attitude in the abusive instances is
fraudulent. But mere fraudulent attitudes are not actionable. The
remedy lies not in fraud.30 The tort of interference with advantage-
ous contractual relationships is similarly unavailable since under the
unilateral offer listing the broker has no protectable contractual re-
lationship until he can show that he was the procuring cause of the
sale. The dissenting opinion in the Keviczky case relied strongly
upon the argument that the plaintiff could not prove damages since
he was not able to prove that had the customer not "conspired," he
would have dealt through the plaintiff-broker.31
A more plausible remedy might be found in the tort of inter-
ference with advantageous business relationships. This remedy is
ever expanding and is today being applied more and more in situa-
tions where the business relationships fall short of contract.3 2  In
Dep't 1949); Avallone v. Bernardi, 83 N. Y. S. 2d 905 (Mt. Vernon City Ct.
1948).
29Smith v. McGovern, 65 N. Y. 574 (1875); Baker v. Thomas, 12 Misc.
432, 33 N. Y. Supp. 613 (C. P. 1895); Feldman v. O'Brien, 23 Misc. 341,
344, 51 N. Y. Supp. 309, 311 (Sup. Ct. 1898).
30 See 12 FORD. L. REv., supra note 25, at 281.
3' Keviczky v. Lorber, 290 N. Y. 297, 309, 49 N. E. 2d 146, 151 (1943).
32 See PROSSER oNr TORTS 975 (1941) ; Note, Torts: Interference With Busi-
ness Relations, 32 CALIF. L. REv. 205 (1944).
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fact, although not named as such, it is probably this field of tort that
the court meant to apply in the Keviczky case when it stated: "The
damage here suffered by plaintiff was the loss of an asset in his busi-
ness and the acquisition by Lorber of that asset." 33
A defendant may be guilty of that tort even in cases where he
does not act deliberately for the purpose of interfering with another's
advantage, but acts for his personal benefit although aware that he is
interfering.84 If this tort is applicable, however, the Keviczky case
has been quite properly limited in its effect to cases where the nego-
tiations are so advanced that it is obvious that the broker is about to
earn a commission. 85 Only then is it clear that the broker has at-
tained a protectable business relationship.
At this point let us note the anomaly in implementing the tort
of interference as a remedy. In order to do so, the court must con-
sider the act of the customer in buying the property to be a tortious
one. No prior acts could be tortious since the customer at all times
retains absolute discretion as to whether or not to buy. But note
that the act of buying the property is the very act which creates the
advantageous situation. The court would have to reason that the very
act, which created the broker's advantage, was the tort that interfered
with it. Such a holding is quite illogical especially when we admit
that the customer had discretionary power throughout as to the crea-
tion of the advantage.
The duty which owes from customer to broker is incurred as
an incident of a relationship of trust. The broker must trust that
the customer will protect the disclosure once made; that he will rec-
ognize that it was made solely in the hope that the broker might earn
a commission; and that he will not misuse the broker's efforts. It
is submitted that the customer, aware of the purpose for which the
broker's disclosure is made, in giving heed to the disclosure impliedly
agrees to accept the broker's trust.
Many alert brokers make a practice of exacting from prospective
purchasers a promise to deal through them if they decide to purchase
any of the listed properties disclosed by the broker. Such express
agreements have been tested, and apparently will be upheld.3 6 The
difficulty lies in proving them if they are not in writing. Customers
are naturally quite averse to signing papers before a broker shows
them anything. Indeed, they may regard the broker's request as an
offensive one, meant to imply that they are untrustworthy. Further-
more, such agreements drafted by laymen and signed by customers
without counsel are quite dangerous. It is submitted that the agree-
ment ought to be implied by the law. The law would merely infer
33 Keviczky v. Lorber, 290 N. Y. 297, 306, 49 N. E. 2d 146, 149 (1943).
34 PRossEm oN TORTS 975 (1941).
35 See note 28 supra.
36 Cf. SpringeK v. Duveen, 164 App. Div. 878, 148 N. Y. Supp. 508 (1st
Dep't 1914).
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that when a customer listens to the broker's offering, he recognizes
the purpose for which it was made and impliedly promises not there-
after to use the disclosure to his own profita 7 Thus, if a second
broker, through greater efforts, induced the customer to buy, the cus-
tomer would not be using the first broker's disclosure to his own ad-
vantage. However, should the customer instruct another broker, for
example, his cousin, to obtain the listing and then purchase through
his cousin, the customer has used the disclosure to his own advantage.
There remains the question of damages. It has been submitted
that the implied contract will only be breached in a situation wherein
the customer profits from abuse of the disclosure. The customer's
profit then is a logical measure of damages. Since, however, the cus-
tomer's misconduct has caused the loss of a full commission to the
broker, the latter sum would seem to be a more equitable measure.
To those who are acquainted with the law of real estate broker-
age, the implication of such a contract may seem to be a radical de-
parture from existing precedent.38 It is submitted, however, that to
those who are familiar with brokerage practice, the proposed modi-
fication would be no more than a recognition by the law of a moral
obligation that has been recognized in practice for many years. It
is understandable that the law has been so reluctant. The history of
unconscionable dealings in real estate brokerage has tainted the hands
of the broker even in the courts of law. Brokers today, however, are
not morally inferior to men of other callings. The law itself gives
them recognition by license.3 9 The strict stare decisis of the uncon-
scionable practices era should be modernized.
37 See Louis Kanm, Inc. v. Flink, 113 N. J. L. 582, 175 Atl. 62 (1934),
wherein the court recognized a property right in the broker's disclosure of the
name of his customer as being his stock in trade.
38In Johnson v. Gustafson, 201 Minn. 629, 277 N. W. 252 (1938), the
broker apparently had a unilateral type listing; his customer bought through
a straw man. Without even discussing the necessity of a showing that the
broker had brought the parties to a point where a deal was inevitable, the
court held the defendant liable in the amount of the commission for interfer-
ence with contractual relationships. The result, that the customer was held
liable for abusing the mere disclosure, is in accord with the solution herein
offered although the reasoning is that of the tort theory.
39 See N. Y. REAL PRop. LAw § 440-a. This section was first added by
Laws of N. Y. 1922, c. 672. The purpose of the section is to assure com-
petency and observance of professional conduct on the part of real estate
brokers and salesmen. In re Wilson Sullivan Co., 289 N. Y. 110, 114, 44 N. E.
2d 387, 389 (1942). See also Massie v. Dudley, 173 Va. 42, 3 S. E. 2d 176,
181 (1939). For a list of the license requirements of the various states, see
VAN BUREN, REAL EsTATE BROKERAGE AND COmmIsSIONS, LAW AND PRAcTICE
299 (1948).
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